Something Borrowed, Something New: The Changing
Role of Novelty in Idea Protection Law
Mary LaFrance∗
Einstein, he said, nothing’s original
Find something new, That’s easy for him to say
Took his whole life explaining his theory
—Lyrics from “We’ve Heard It All Before,” by British
1
pop band 10cc.

I. INTRODUCTION
Ideas that do not qualify for legal protection, it is well settled,
2
are free to the world once they have been disclosed. Yet states vary
considerably in the scope of, and prerequisites for, legal protection
granted to ideas. Variations in state approaches to idea protection
3
are well documented. The states most often highlighted for their
4
contrasting approaches are New York and California.
Idea
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1
10CC, We’ve Heard It All Before, on TEN OUT OF 10 (Warner Brothers 1982).
2
See, e.g., Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918); Desny v.
Wilder, 299 P.2d 257 (Cal. 1956); Bristol v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y, 30 N.E.
506, 507 (N.Y. 1892); 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & RAYMOND NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 16.01 (1987) [hereinafter NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT] (stating the general
rule that “ideas are ‘free as air’” unless they qualify under one of several common-law
theories of legal protection); Melville B. Nimmer, The Law of Ideas, 27 S. CAL. L. REV.
119 (1954) (same). In addition to the common-law idea protection doctrines
discussed in this Article, ideas may qualify for protection under patent law, copyright
law, trade secret law, or trademark law, depending on the form in which the
particular ideas are embodied.
3
See, e.g., 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 2, §§ 16.01-16.08; Lionel S. Sobel,
The Law of Ideas, Revisited, 1 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 9 (1994); Ronald Caswell, Comment,
A Comparison and Critique of Idea Protection in California, New York, and Great Britain, 14
LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 717, 721 (1992).
4
See, e.g., Camilla M. Jackson, “I’ve Got This Great Idea for a Movie!” A Comparison of
the Laws in California and New York that Protect Idea Submissions, 21 COLUM.-VLA J.L. &
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protection doctrine in these two jurisdictions differs primarily in the
role played by the concept of “novelty.” There is no one authoritative
5
definition of novelty in this context; indeed, courts typically use the
term without defining it. As discussed below, the function of the
novelty requirement is to establish that the idea has value and that
6
the defendant actually used the plaintiff’s idea and benefited from it.
Under California law, if an idea is disclosed pursuant to an
express contract, or a contract implied in fact, novelty is not required
for the disclosure of that idea to constitute valid consideration for the
7
contract. By contrast, New York requires some form of novelty as a
prerequisite to all forms of idea protection other than post-disclosure
8
contracts. In recent years, the New York courts have modified the
novelty requirement for pre-disclosure contracts, requiring only that
9
the idea be novel to the buyer. For an idea to be protected under
10
unjust enrichment/quasi-contract, however, the idea must be novel
in the general or absolute sense—in other words, unknown not only
11
to the buyer but also to the public in general.
The relevance of novelty in the contractual protection of ideas
12
has been widely debated. Yet the leading novelty case in New Jersey,
13
Flemming v. Ronson Corp., has received relatively little attention since
14
it was decided in 1969. Recently, in Johnson v. Benjamin Moore & Co.,
the New Jersey Appellate Division demonstrated a willingness to
adopt a stringent novelty standard. Due to a fortuitous turn of
ARTS 47 (1996).
5
See, e.g., 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 2, § 16.08. In contrast, novelty in
federal patent law has a specific and stringent definition. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2003).
6
See generally MICHAEL A. EPSTEIN, MODERN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 265-73
(1992).
7
Caswell, supra note 3, at 727-37; see, e.g., Donahue v. Ziv Television Programs,
Inc., 54 Cal. Rptr. 130 (Ct. App. 1966) (noting that an idea that is not novel “may be
valuable to the person to whom it is disclosed simply because the disclosure takes
place at the right time”).
8
Caswell, supra note 3, at 738-50; see supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
9
See infra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
10
For a fuller discussion of quasi-contract based on unjust enrichment, see infra
note 56.
11
Caswell, supra note 3, at 746-47, 749-50; see infra note 17 and accompanying
text.
12
See, e.g., 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 2, § 16.08; Jo Bailey Brown,
Liability in Submission of Idea Cases, 29 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 161 (1947);
George H. Lee, Submission of Ideas—A Possible Solution, 29 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC’Y 895 (1947).
13
107 N.J. Super. 311, 258 A.2d 153 (Law Div. 1969), aff’d, 114 N.J. Super. 221,
275 A.2d 759 (App. Div. 1971).
14
347 N.J. Super. 71, 788 A.2d 906 (App. Div.), cert. granted and summarily
remanded, 172 N.J. 176, 796 A.2d 893 (2002).
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events, however, Johnson has since been remanded, and no longer
represents controlling law. Hence, the New Jersey courts have an
opportunity to reconsider the direction taken by Johnson, and carve
out a more thoughtful approach to determining the validity of
contracts for the use of ideas.
Part II of this Article examines the significant changes in New
York’s application of the novelty standard to idea protection contracts
during the past decade. Part III discusses the evolution of idea
protection law in New Jersey. An evaluation of the New York and
New Jersey case law reveals significant flaws in the arguments for
treating novelty as an essential element of a contract for the use of an
idea. Furthermore, it suggests that New Jersey should reconsider its
most recent application of the novelty standard to idea protection
contracts.
II. NEW YORK IDEA PROTECTION LAW
Under New York law, and generally throughout the United
States, if an idea, trade secret, or system is disclosed without contract
protection, “it must follow the law of ideas, and become the
15
acquisition of whoever receives it.”
In the absence of express
agreements, idea submitters have proceeded under a number of
theories in New York, some of them overlapping. The courts have
not always clearly differentiated these theories.
As a threshold matter, New York courts have generally required
an idea to be reduced to “concrete” form before applying any theory
of protection other than an express pre-disclosure contract. Thus,
they have declined to find an implied contract to compensate for the
use of an idea, regardless of novelty, where the disclosure involved an
abstract idea that was not protected “by an express contract prior to
16
disclosure.”
A second, very important threshold requirement that applies to
all theories of idea protection in New York, with the notable
exception of post-disclosure contracts, is the requirement that the idea
17
be “novel.” Because non-novel ideas “‘are in the public domain and
15

Bristol v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y, 30 N.E. 506, 507 (N.Y. 1892).
Williamson v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 16 N.Y.S.2d 217, 217-18 (App. Div. 1939)
(per curiam); accord Stone v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 23 N.Y.S.2d 210, 212
(App. Div. 1940); Alberts v. Remington Rand, Inc., 23 N.Y.S.2d 892, 894 (Sup. Ct.
1940).
17
See, e.g., Nadel v. Play-By-Play Toys & Novelties, Inc., 208 F.3d 368 (2d Cir.
2000); Apfel v. Prudential-Bache Sec. Inc., 616 N.E.2d 1095 (N.Y. 1993); Downey v.
Gen. Foods Corp., 286 N.E.2d 257 (N.Y. 1972); Soule v. Bon Ami Co., 139 N.E. 754
(N.Y. 1923) (mem.); Robinson v. Viacom Int’l, Inc., 663 N.Y.S.2d 817 (App. Div.
16
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may freely be used by anyone with impunity,’ . . . [a]n idea which is a
18
variation on a basic theme will not support a finding of novelty.”
Similarly, “‘[i]mprovement of standard technique or quality, the
judicious use of existing means, or the mixture of known ingredients
in somewhat different proportions . . . partake more of the nature of
19
elaboration and renovation than of innovation.’”
The explicit exception for post-disclosure contracts is a relatively
recent development. Prior to the 1993 decision in Apfel v. Prudential
20
Bache-Securities Inc., New York law was widely, though perhaps not
accurately, understood to require absolute novelty under all theories
21
of idea protection, including express and implied-in-fact contracts.
In Apfel, however, the New York Court of Appeals rejected this rule,
and announced a somewhat reduced role for novelty in the
22
contractual protection of ideas. In doing so, it relied almost entirely
23
on the 1930 case of Keller v. American Chain Co.
Keller was an unlikely source for a revolution in New York’s idea
protection laws. Since it issued in 1930, state and federal courts
1997) (mem.); Marraccini v. Bertelsmann Music Group, Inc., 644 N.Y.S.2d 875 (App.
Div. 1996); Surplus Equip., Inc. v. Xerox Corp., 502 N.Y.S.2d 491 (App. Div. 1986);
Oasis Music, Inc. v. 900 U.S.A., Inc., 614 N.Y.S.2d 878 (Sup. Ct. 1994).
18
Oasis Music, 614 N.Y.S.2d at 881-82 (quoting Ed Graham Prods., Inc. v. Nat’l
Broad. Co., 347 N.Y.S.2d 766, 769 (Sup. Ct. 1973)).
19
Id. (quoting Educ. Sales Programs, Inc. v. Dreyfus Corp., 317 N.Y.S.2d 840, 844
(Sup. Ct. 1970)).
20
616 N.E.2d 1095 (N.Y. 1993).
21
See, e.g., Murray v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 844 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1988); Downey, 286
N.E.2d 257; Soule, 139 N.E. 754. However, there was some contrary authority with
respect to contractual idea protection. See, e.g., Krisel v. Duran, 258 F. Supp. 845, 860
(S.D.N.Y. 1966) (stating that under New York law even a non-novel idea may be
protected by contract); High v. Trade Union Courier Publ’g Corp., 69 N.Y.S.2d 526,
529 (Sup. Ct. 1946), aff’d, 89 N.Y.S.2d 527 (App. Div. 1949). In Miller v. Universal
Pictures Co., 180 N.E.2d 248 (N.Y. 1961), Judge Burke wrote in dissent:
The fundamental law is that where there is an agreement . . . the
parties to the contract must remain faithful to its terms whether or not
the disclosure is novel or original. . . . ‘There is nothing unreasonable
in the assumption that a producer would obligate himself to pay for the
disclosure of an idea . . . which in fact, he would be unable to use but
for the disclosure. . . . [T]he test for a property right, applied in
common law copyright cases, is that the work be new, novel and in
concrete form. . . . [T]his property right test [is] not a part of any
traditional contract action. . . . The reason for the requirement in
common law copyright was that to have a remedy good against the
world, a property right must be shown. This reason for the test is
missing in an action on a contract.’
Id. at 250 (emphasis and some paragraph structure omitted) (quoting Chandler v.
Roach, 319 P.2d 776, 781 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957)).
22
See Apfel, 616 N.E.2d at 1097.
23
174 N.E. 74 (N.Y. 1930).
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wrestling with New York’s idea protection doctrine cited it
sporadically over a sixty-year period. Yet Keller had articulated
narrowing interpretations of the two leading cases on which prior
24
New York decisions had relied, Soule v. Bon Ami Co., and Masline v.
25
New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co. In each of those cases, the
Keller court noted, “the plaintiffs’ imparted information was nothing
new, being an idea open and apparent to everyone, and well known
26
for years.” In contrast, the plaintiff in Keller expended significant
effort to acquire his information, which he then disclosed to the
defendant in exchange for the defendant’s promise to pay a share of
the profits. The defendant in turn made a profit from using the
plaintiff’s information.
Citing precedents establishing “[t]hat
information may be a valuable consideration for a promise to pay for
27
it,” the Keller court concluded that the plaintiff’s information
benefited the defendant and therefore, as a matter of law, constituted
28
sufficient consideration for the defendant’s promise to pay.
However, the Keller court’s conclusion on the sufficiency of the
plaintiff’s information as consideration for a contract proved to be
dictum. The court ultimately ruled against the plaintiff, finding a
29
pre-existing duty to disclose this information to the defendant.
In the years between Keller and Apfel, the New York courts
interpreted Keller’s dictum on idea protection inconsistently. Some
30
courts cited it to support a novelty requirement, while others cited it
31
for the opposite proposition. Still other courts cited it for the more
limited proposition that information may be consideration for a
contract, while finding support for a novelty requirement in other
32
case law. Other New York courts simply ignored Keller, and held that
24

139 N.E. 754 (N.Y. 1923) (mem.), aff’g 195 N.Y.S. 574 (App. Div. 1922).
112 A. 639 (Conn. 1921).
26
Keller, 174 N.E. at 74. The court also noted that the affirmance in Soule was
based on the plaintiff’s failure “to prove profits as the basis for his recovery.” Id.
27
Id. at 75 (citing, inter alia, Green v. Brooks, 22 P. 849 (Cal. 1889); Haskins v.
Ryan, 78 A. 566 (N.J. 1908); Bristol, 30 N.E. 506; Cobb v. Cowdery, 40 Vt. 25 (1867)).
28
Id.
29
Id. (“The difficulty in the plaintiff’s case is that his information, although by its
nature a sufficient consideration for a contract, failed to be such because of the
relation which the plaintiff bore to the defendant.”).
30
Shapiro v. Press Publ’g Co., 255 N.Y.S. 899, 899 (App. Div. 1932) (citing Keller
for the proposition that a “plan or idea, if novel and of value, was sufficient
consideration” for a promise to pay).
31
High, 69 N.Y.S. at 529 (“[A]n idea, if valuable, may be the subject of contract.
While the idea disclosed may be common or even open to public knowledge, yet
such disclosure if protected by contract, is sufficient consideration for the promise to
pay.”).
32
Singer v. Karron, 294 N.Y.S. 566, 569 (Mun. Ct. 1937) (citing Shapiro and Soule
25
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novelty was a prerequisite even to contractual idea protection.
Apfel derived yet another meaning from Keller’s dictum. The
plaintiff in Apfel disclosed an idea to the defendant pursuant to a
confidentiality agreement. After the disclosure, the defendant
entered into a separate post-disclosure contract to pay for the use of
the idea. The defendant failed to deliver on its promise to pay, and
asserted that the contract was unenforceable because the idea was not
absolutely or generally novel, as required by Soule and Downey v.
34
General Foods Corp.
The Apfel court rejected the argument that Soule and Downey had
established absolute or general novelty as an essential element of a
35
contract-based idea protection claim. Instead, the court concluded
that these cases recognized novelty merely as an element of proof:
While our cases have discussed novelty as an element of an idea
seller’s claim, it is not a discrete supplemental requirement, but
simply part of plaintiff’s proof of either a proprietary interest in a
claim based on a property theory or the validity of the
36
consideration in a claim based on a contract theory.

The court distinguished Downey, which had rejected a plaintiff’s
idea protection claims under both property and contract theories, on
the ground that the defendant in Downey had possession of the
plaintiff’s idea before the plaintiff disclosed it. In the view of the
Apfel court, this finding established that the idea in Downey “could
have no value to defendant and could not supply consideration for
37
any agreement between the parties.”
Apfel also distinguished Soule.
While conceding that the
appellate division in that case had rejected the plaintiff’s contract
claim on the ground that “the bargain lacked consideration because
38
the idea was not novel,” the court of appeals noted that its own
affirmance of the case had rested on different grounds, namely, that
the “plaintiff had failed to show that profits resulted from the

for the proposition that “the information must be new or novel and valuable, or
thought to be so”).
33
E.g., Downey, 286 N.E.2d at 259 (“[W]hen one submits an idea to another, no
promise to pay for its use may be implied, and no asserted agreement enforced, if
the elements of novelty and originality are absent, since the property right in an idea
is based on these two elements.”) (citing, inter alia, Soule, 195 N.Y.S. at 575).
34
286 N.E.2d 257 (N.Y. 1972).
35
Apfel, 616 N.E.2d at 1097.
36
Id. (citing 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 2, ch. 16).
37
Id.
38
Id.
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39

disclosure.” Having distinguished Downey and Soule, the Apfel court
explicitly rejected the argument that novelty was a requirement of
every idea protection claim, citing only Keller, a pre-disclosure
40
contract case, for support.
Clarifying its position, the court of appeals divided contractbased idea protection claims into two categories: those in which the
parties entered into the putative contract prior to the plaintiff’s
disclosure of the idea to the defendant, and those in which the
parties entered their contract after this disclosure. The court noted
that:
Downey, Soule and cases in that line of decisions involve a distinct
factual pattern: the buyer and seller contract for disclosure of the
idea with payment based on use, but no separate postdisclosure
contract for use of the idea has been made. Thus, they present
the issue of whether the idea the buyer was using was, in fact, the
41
seller’s.

Novelty, the court concluded, was important only to contract
cases in which the buyer entered the contract before the seller had
disclosed the idea. Thus, while retaining a novelty requirement for
pre-disclosure contracts, Apfel dispensed with novelty altogether as a
requirement for post-disclosure contracts. The court justified this
distinction on the ground that pre-disclosure contracts are fraught
with greater dangers for idea recipients:
Such transactions pose two problems for the courts. On the
one hand, how can sellers prove that the buyer obtained the idea
from them, and nowhere else, and that the buyer’s use of it thus
constitutes misappropriation of property?
Unlike tangible
property, an idea lacks title and boundaries and cannot be
rendered exclusive by the acts of the one who first thinks it. On
the other hand, there is no equity in enforcing a seemingly valid
contract when, in fact, it turns out upon disclosure that the buyer
already possessed the idea. In such instances, the disclosure,
though freely bargained for, is manifestly without value. A
showing of novelty, at least novelty as to the buyer, addresses these
two concerns. Novelty can then serve to establish both the
attributes of ownership necessary for a property-based claim and
the value of the consideration—the disclosure—necessary for
contract-based claims.
There are no such concerns in a transaction such as the one
before us. Defendant does not claim that it was aware of the idea
39
40
41

Id.
Apfel, 616 N.E.2d at 1097.
Id. at 1098.
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before plaintiffs disclosed it but, rather, concedes that the idea
came from them. When a seller’s claim arises from a contract to
use an idea entered into after the disclosure of the idea, the
question is not whether the buyer misappropriated property from
the seller, but whether the idea had value to the buyer and thus
constitutes valid consideration. In such a case, the buyer knows
what he or she is buying and has agreed that the idea has value,
and the Court will not ordinarily go behind that determination.
The lack of novelty, in and of itself, does not demonstrate a lack
of value. To the contrary, the buyer may reap benefits from such
a contract in a number of ways—for instance, by not having to
expend resources pursuing the idea through other channels or by
having a profit-making idea implemented sooner rather than
later. The law of contracts would have to be substantially
rewritten were we to allow buyers of fully disclosed ideas to
disregard their obligation to pay simply because an idea could
have been obtained from some other source or in some other
42
way.

Thus, the court of appeals in Apfel clearly intended to eliminate
any novelty requirement for post-disclosure contracts. However, it
did more than that. While it retained novelty as a requirement for
pre-disclosure contracts, the court also lowered the threshold for
novelty. Rather than requiring an idea to be novel to the world, it
43
required the idea to be novel only to the buyer. Consistent with its
narrow interpretations of Soule and Downey, the Apfel court implicitly
held that an idea can be sufficiently novel to serve as consideration
for a pre-disclosure contract so long as the buyer is not already in
possession of that same idea. The existence of that state of affairs, of
course, would not be apparent until after the disclosure had already
taken place. Thus, under the Apfel approach, at the time the parties
enter the pre-disclosure contract, neither of them will know for
certain whether that contract will prove to be enforceable.
On authority of Apfel, the Second Circuit revised its previous
interpretation of New York law in Nadel v. Play-By-Play Toys &
44
Novelties, Inc. The Second Circuit read Apfel’s oblique reference to

42

Id. at 1098 (internal citation omitted).
Id. Thus, novelty, as it applies to patent law, would not be required. Accord
Softel, Inc. v. Dragon Med. & Sci. Communications, Inc., 118 F.3d 955, 969 (2d Cir.
1997).
44
208 F.3d 368 (2d Cir. 2000). The Second Circuit abrogated the interpretation
of New York law it had adopted in Murray v. National Broadcasting Co., 844 F.2d 988
(2d Cir. 1988), where it held that absolute novelty was a prerequisite to all theories of
idea protection in New York, including express contracts.
43
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45

“novelty as to the buyer” as a clear articulation of a new legal
standard for pre-disclosure contracts under New York law. The Nadel
court reasoned that “[w]hile an idea may be unoriginal or non-novel
in a general sense, it may have substantial value to a particular buyer
who is unaware of it and therefore willing to enter into contract to
46
acquire and exploit it.” Thus, Nadel concluded that “[f]or contractbased claims in submission-of-idea cases, a showing of novelty to the
47
buyer will supply sufficient consideration to support a contract.”
Therefore, under current New York law, while novelty is
required for all theories of idea protection other than post-disclosure
contracts, the degree of novelty differs depending on the theory the
plaintiff advances. Where the plaintiff pleads express or implied-in48
fact contract, it is only necessary that the idea be novel to the buyer.
In contrast, for a quasi-contract/unjust enrichment claim, or a claim
of misappropriation arising from a breach of a confidential
relationship, the idea must be absolutely novel; it is not sufficient that
49
it is unknown only to the recipient of the disclosure. These rules
were summarized by the Second Circuit in Nadel as follows:
In sum, we find that New York law in submission-of-idea cases is
governed by the following principles: Contract-based claims
require only a showing that the disclosed idea was novel to the
buyer in order to find consideration. Such claims involve a factspecific inquiry that focuses on the perspective of the particular
buyer. By contrast, misappropriation claims require that the idea
at issue be original and novel in absolute terms. This is so
because unoriginal, known ideas have no value as property and
the law does not protect against the use of that which is free and
available to all. Finally, an idea may be so unoriginal or lacking in
novelty generally that, as a matter of law, the buyer is deemed to
have knowledge of the idea. In such cases, neither a propertybased nor a contract-based claim for uncompensated use of the
50
idea may lie.
45

Apfel, 616 N.E.2d at 1098.
Nadel, 208 F.3d at 377. The Second Circuit acknowledged that two post-Apfel
contract cases decided in the New York courts appeared to apply the general novelty
standard rather than the novelty-to-the-buyer standard, but it was not persuaded that
those cases eroded the precedential authority of Apfel. Id. at 379-80 (discussing
Marraccini, 644 N.Y.S.2d 875; Oasis Music, 614 N.Y.S.2d 878).
47
Id. at 376.
48
Id. at 375-76 (citing Apfel, 616 N.E.2d at 1097-98). Nadel notes that novelty to
the buyer is a fact-specific inquiry. Id. at 378-80.
49
Id.
50
Id. at 380 (footnote omitted); see also Nadel v. Play By Play Toys & Novelties, Inc.,
34 F. Supp. 2d 180, 184 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (distinguishing post-disclosure contracts
as not requiring novelty), aff’d, 208 F.3d 368 (2d Cir. 2000); Apfel, 616 N.E.2d at
46
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Missing from Nadel’s discussion of novelty, however, is any
acknowledgment that Apfel characterized novelty, even novelty to the
buyer, as a type of circumstantial evidence rather than a doctrinal
requirement. Although the Second Circuit adopted the novelty-tothe-buyer standard for contract-based idea protection claims, it
strongly implied that novelty was an essential element of these claims.
Thus, a low degree of novelty could not be overcome by other
evidence that the defendant copied and profited from the idea.
There are other, more fundamental problems with both the
Nadel and Apfel holdings. The law is well-settled that an idea, once
51
disclosed without legal protection, is free for the recipient to use. In
the typical scenario in which one party offers to sell an idea to
another, the first step is to enter into a confidentiality agreement
requiring the recipient to refrain from using or disclosing the idea
without the seller’s consent. By retaining the novelty-to-the-buyer
requirement for pre-disclosure contracts, New York’s approach
virtually ensures that the parties to a pre-disclosure contract cannot
know at the time of contracting whether their agreement will be
enforceable. The parties do not know whether a court, in hindsight,
might subsequently rule the contract invalid for lack of
52
consideration. This lack of predictability interferes with the ability
of the parties to bargain successfully, thus hampering the market for
all ideas other than those rare ideas that the seller perceives as
unquestionably novel to the buyer. Moreover, this unpredictability is
a trap for the unwary, since a seller’s perceptions about his or her
own ideas are likely to be somewhat biased in favor of novelty.
A second problem becomes apparent when New York’s novelty
requirement for pre-disclosure contracts is combined with Apfel’s
elimination of that requirement for post-disclosure contracts. A nonnovel idea disclosed pursuant to a pre-disclosure contract is
unprotected. The rule that an idea, once disclosed without legal
protection, is free for the taking, is a specific application of the
general rule that past consideration is insufficient for a valid
1097-98 (similar); accord Khreativity Unlimited v. Mattel, Inc., 101 F. Supp. 2d 177,
185 (S.D.N.Y.) (noting that “[a]fter Nadel, the general novelty cases are no longer
controlling for contract-based claims,” but holding that general novelty is still an
essential element of an unjust enrichment claim), aff’d, 242 F.3d 366 (2d Cir. 2000),
cert. denied, 534 U.S. 822 (2001).
51
See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
52
The dangers of 20/20 hindsight are well illustrated in the analogous setting of
federal patent law, where courts have struggled to determine, years after an
invention was conceived, whether, at the time of the invention, the idea was too
“obvious” to be patentable. See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 35-36
(1966).
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53

contract. In other words, if an idea seller blurts out his or her idea,
and the recipient subsequently promises to pay for the use of that
idea, under general contract principles the promise to pay is
54
unenforceable. If a non-novel idea is disclosed pursuant to a predisclosure contract, under New York law it is as though the idea had
simply been blurted out, because the contract is invalid due to the
55
absence of consideration.
Because the non-novel idea has been
disclosed pursuant to an unenforceable promise to pay, that idea
enjoys no legal protection and the recipient may freely use it without
the seller’s consent. Hence, any attempt to form a post-disclosure
contract to pay for the use of that idea would be unavailing.
Although novelty is not required for such a contract to be
enforceable, the idea has been disclosed before any contract was
formed. Thus, the post-disclosure contract is unenforceable because
it is based on past consideration. Nothing in the Apfel opinion
indicates that the court intended to override this longstanding
common-law rule, or even that it realized that such an outcome
would be the effect of its holding.
III. NEW JERSEY IDEA PROTECTION LAW
New Jersey idea protection law is sparse.
53

56

An early New Jersey

In general, a promise made in exchange for past consideration is invalid. See,
e.g., Gellert v. Dick, 13 N.E.2d 603 (N.Y. 1938); 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 2,
§ 16.04 (applying this principle to ideas that are disclosed prior to entering a
contract). There are rare exceptions to this principle. See, e.g., Desny v. Wilder, 299
P.2d 257 (Cal. 1956).
54
That is, non-novel to the buyer. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
55
See Nadel, 208 F.3d at 375 (quoting Apfel).
56
New Jersey law recognizes claims by idea submitters (whether or not
employees) under several doctrines: express and implied-in-fact contracts, quasicontracts (also called unjust enrichment or contract implied in law), and
misappropriation through breach of a confidential relationship. In contrast, there
are no New Jersey cases recognizing a claim for conversion based on the use of an
idea. The authorities discussing this point, however, refer only to “abstract ideas,
incapable of material embodiment,” and thus leave open the possibility that a more
“concrete” idea might be the subject of a conversion claim. See In re Elsinore Shore
Assocs., 102 B.R. 958, 969 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1989) (citing Flemming v. Ronson Corp.,
107 N.J. Super. 311, 315, 258 A.2d 153, 156 (Law Div. 1969), aff’d, 114 N.J. Super.
221, 275 A.2d 759 (App. Div. 1971); McGhan v. Ebersol, 608 F. Supp. 277, 284
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (applying New York law)).
New Jersey law also recognizes a quasi-contract (or implied-in-law contract)
claim for the use of an idea, based on unjust enrichment. A successful quasi-contract
claim requires “‘that defendant received a benefit from plaintiff which it is unjust for
[defendant] to retain without compensation, and that plaintiff, in conferring the
benefit, expected remuneration.’” Kopin v. Orange Prods., Inc., 297 N.J. Super. 353,
367, 688 A.2d 130, 137 (App. Div. 1997) (quoting Cohen v. Home Ins. Co., 230 N.J.
Super 72, 82, 552 A.2d 654, 659 (App. Div. 1989)). The New Jersey Supreme Court
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case, however, rejected a novelty requirement in the case of express
57
contracts. In a 1933 decision, Elfenbein v. Luckenback Terminals, Inc.,
the New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals upheld a pre-disclosure
contract in which the defendant corporation agreed to pay the
plaintiff a specified percentage of any cost savings resulting from the
plaintiff’s idea disclosure. The plaintiff in that case disclosed an idea
for reducing the defendant’s taxes. The defendant used the idea,
profited from it, and then refused to pay, arguing that the idea
involved a legal strategy that could be derived from reading the
58
relevant statutes.
Although the disclosure consisted of publicly
available information, the court found that the disclosure was valid
59
consideration.
In the seventy years since Elfenbein was decided, state and federal
courts construing New Jersey’s common law of idea protection have
has stated that:
[A] quasi-contractual obligation is wholly unlike an express or impliedin-fact contract in that it is “imposed by the law for the purpose of
bringing about justice without reference to the intention of the
parties.”
....
Like the equitable doctrine of restitution, the key element of a quasicontract claim is that one party has been unjustly enriched at the
expense of another. Recovery under both doctrines is typically
measured by the amount the defendant has benefited from the
plaintiff’s performance.
Wanaque Borough Sewerage Auth. v. Township of W. Milford, 144 N.J. 564, 574-75,
677 A.2d 747, 752-53 (1996) (quoting St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Indem. Ins.
Co., 32 N.J. 17, 22, 158 A.2d 825, 827 (1960)).
Recovery in quasi-contract is permitted “even though the parties’ words and
actions are insufficient to manifest an intent to agree to the proffered terms [of a
contract].” Weichert Co. Realtors v. Ryan, 128 N.J. 427, 437, 608 A.2d 280, 285
(1992).
Courts may therefore impose restitution under quasi-contract for
misappropriation of an idea under the following conditions:
[W]here a person communicates a novel idea to another with the
intention that the latter may use the idea and compensate him for such
use, the other party is liable for such use and must pay compensation if
he actually appropriates the idea and employs it in connection with his
own activities. A plaintiff is required to establish as a prerequisite to
relief that (1) the idea was novel; (2) it was made in confidence; and
(3) it was adopted and made use of.
Flemming, 107 N.J. Super. at 317, 258 A.2d at 156-57 (citations omitted); see also In re
Elsinore Shore, 102 B.R. 958; Kopin, 297 N.J. Super. at 367, 688 A.2d at 137.
New Jersey law treats quantum meruit as a form of quasi-contract which allows
the plaintiff to recover the reasonable value of services rendered. Kopin, 297 N.J.
Super. at 367-69, 688 A.2d at 137-38 (citing Matarese v. Moore-McCormack Lines,
Inc., 158 F.2d 631, 633-35 (2d Cir. 1946)).
57
111 N.J.L. 67, 166 A. 91 (1933).
58
Id. at 71-72, 166 A. at 93.
59
Id. at 72, 166 A. at 93.
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utterly ignored the decision.
Interestingly, however, courts
construing California’s common law, under which novelty is not
required in the case of express and implied contracts, have cited
60
Elfenbein favorably.
More than thirty-five years passed after Elfenbein before the New
Jersey courts revisited the law of idea protection. A trial court
decided New Jersey’s leading case on recovery for unauthorized use
61
of an idea, Flemming v. Ronson Corp., some twenty-four years before
Apfel. Nevertheless, Flemming has received considerably less attention
than Apfel from courts and commentators, probably because idea
protection cases are far less common in New Jersey than in New York.
Flemming addressed claims based on both express contract and quasicontract/unjust enrichment. The court found no express contract,
because the defendant had never promised to pay for the idea.
Instead, the court found that a mere “invitation to Flemming to
submit details for evaluation, coupled with an undertaking to contact
him for further arrangements should the proposal be of interest, as
well as an assurance that all materials submitted would be returned if
the submission was not accepted,” was not enough to create an
express contract, even if the defendant accepted and used the
62
plaintiff’s idea. Because the court found no meeting of the minds,
and therefore no possibility of contract formation, it simply did not
reach the question of whether novelty was a prerequisite to an
enforceable contract for the use of an idea.
Instead, Flemming addressed novelty only in the context of the
63
plaintiff’s claim for unjust enrichment under quasi-contract. The
60

See, e.g., Desny v. Wilder, 299 P.2d 257, 270 (Cal. 1956); Blaustein v. Burton, 9
Cal. App. 3d 161, 182 (1970).
61
107 N.J. Super. 311, 258 A.2d 153 (Law Div. 1969). A much older federal case
dealing with facts arising in New Jersey strongly implied that novelty is a condition to
recovering for the use of an idea that was disclosed in confidence. See Smoley v. N.J.
Zinc Co., 24 F. Supp. 294, 300 (D.N.J. 1938), aff’d, 106 F.2d 314 (3d Cir. 1939).
However, Smoley did not rely on any New Jersey case law, and instead followed the
pre-Erie practice of applying general “federal common law.” See Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (overturning prior law which permitted federal courts
in diversity cases to override state common law in order to establish a uniform
federal common law). Flemming acknowledges this case but treats novelty as
probative rather than substantive. Flemming, 107 N.J. Super. at 317, 258 A.2d at 157.
62
Flemming, 107 N.J. Super. at 315, 258 A.2d at 155. The court explained that
“[t]he minds of the parties never met.” Id. In addition, because the defendant sent
the plaintiff a post-submission letter stating “[w]e have received your submission and
find that we are not interested in it at the present time,” id. at 314, 258 A.2d at 155,
the court stated that “[t]he law will not imply a promise on the part of a person
against his own express declaration,” id. at 315, 258 A.2d at 156.
63
Where there has been an unsolicited submission of an idea, . . . the
question which arises is whether, on the facts presented, the recipient
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court found it unnecessary to decide whether “a mere abstract idea,
incapable of material embodiment,” could be the subject of a claim
for conversion or misappropriation, because Flemming’s idea was
“concrete and usable” in that it could be transformed into a physical
64
product.
The court, however, had greater difficulty with the
question whether novelty is a prerequisite to any theory of recovery
for the use of an idea. In a rather ambiguous discussion of the role of
novelty in idea protection cases, Flemming stopped short of expressly
requiring novelty as a substantive prerequisite for idea protection,
while acknowledging the importance of novelty as a probative factor
in determining whether the defendant in fact copied the plaintiff’s
idea. This discussion of novelty, however, is entirely in the context of
quasi-contract:
It has been held that where a person communicates a novel idea
to another with the intention that the latter may use the idea and
compensate him for such use, the other party is liable for such use
and must pay compensation if he actually appropriates the idea
and employs it in connection with his own activities. A plaintiff is
required to establish as a prerequisite to relief that (1) the idea
was novel; (2) it was made in confidence, and (3) it was adopted
and made use of. Although novelty has been considered
significant in these and other cases, this element is more
important for its evidentiary value than for substantive quality. In
other words, where the issue is whether one’s idea has in fact
been used by another, similarities between the submission and
the ultimate product may justify the factual inference that one was
copied from the other. If the concept submitted is unique, or if
there are many points of likeness, the inference is strengthened.
On the other hand, a lack of novelty or the existence of many
dissimilar features will support a denial that the idea was used by
65
the recipient.

is liable, if at all, by reason of a quasi-contractual obligation based on
the doctrine of unjust enrichment. An idea, as distinguished from the
copyrighted contents of a book or a patented device or process, is
accorded no protection in the law unless it is acquired and used in
such circumstances that the law will imply a contractual or fiduciary
relationship between the parties. Generally, one who receives a benefit
which it is unjust for him to retain ought to make restitution or pay the
value of the benefit to the party entitled thereto.
Id. at 315-16, 258 A.2d at 156.
64
Id. at 316-17, 258 A.2d at 156.
65
Id. at 317-18; 258 A.2d at 156-57 (internal citations omitted) (citing Indus. v.
A.E. Peterson Mfg. Co., 165 F. Supp. 523 (S.D. Cal. 1958); Matarese, 158 F.2d 631;
Mitchell Novelty Co. v. United Mfg. Co., 199 F.2d 462 (7th Cir. 1952); De Filippis v.
Chrysler Corp., 53 F. Supp. 977 (S.D.N.Y. 1944), aff’d, 159 F.2d 478 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 331 U.S. 848 (1947); Official Airlines Schedule Info. Serv., Inc. v. E. Air Lines,
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On this basis, the court narrowed its statement of the issue “to a
determination of whether [the defendant] actually copied or used
66
Flemming’s idea, or was aided by it in developing its own product.”
By framing the issue in this way, the court made clear that it was
treating novelty as a probative factor, rather than as a substantive
element of the plaintiff’s claim.
On the facts, Flemming found only a “superficial resemblance”
67
between the plaintiff’s idea and the defendant’s product.
Furthermore, the court found that the ideas common to both
products were merely “a different application of a long-established
68
principle.” Accordingly, these ideas were “not so novel as to create
the inference that defendant utilized or copied plaintiff’s idea,” as
69
opposed to deriving a similar idea from public domain sources.
Thus, Flemming indicates that novelty is an important factor in
evaluating a plaintiff’s claim for recovery for the use of an idea. Yet it
also suggests that its importance derives from its probative value,
rather than from any absolute principle that would override the
freedom of contract and require courts to second-guess the decisions
of the contracting parties. It appears, then, that Flemming did not
embrace a per se rule that lack of novelty is fatal to an idea protection
claim. Nor did it indicate whether novelty should play a different
role—or, indeed, any role at all—when a plaintiff’s claim is based on
contract rather than quasi-contract.
Flemming’s rationale for requiring novelty in the context of a
quasi-contract claim is not necessarily persuasive in the context of a
true contract claim. A federal court decision construing Flemming
some thirty years later noted that a quasi-contract claim is based on
70
tort law rather than contract law. Because the defendant in such a
case has not expressed a promise to pay, either verbally or by its
actions, no contract is formed, and the obligation to pay must be
imposed, if at all, by law. This rationale compels a court to determine
whether circumstances exist that warrant imposing an obligation on a
71
party who has not assented to it. In effect, when such circumstances

Inc., 333 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1964); Stevens v. Cont’l Can Co., 308 F.2d 100 (6th Cir.
1962); Smoley, 24 F. Supp. 294; Lueddecke v. Chevrolet Motors Co., 70 F.2d 345 (8th
Cir. 1934); Int’l Indus., Inc. v. Warren Petroleum Corp., 99 F. Supp. 907 (D.C. Del.
1951), aff’d, 248 F.2d 696 (3d Cir. 1957), cert. dismissed, 355 U.S. 943 (1958)).
66
Id. at 318, 258 A.2d at 157 (emphasis added).
67
Id.
68
Flemming, 107 N.J. Super. at 318, 258 A.2d at 157.
69
Id. at 319, 258 A.2d at 158.
70
Duffy v. Charles Schwab & Co., 123 F. Supp. 2d 802, 808 (D.N.J. 2000).
71
Although not explicitly stated in [Flemming], the court’s opinion
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are found to exist, there is a “constructive” promise to pay.
explained in Flemming:

As

Where there has been an unsolicited submission of an idea, . . .
the question which arises is whether, on the facts presented, the
recipient is liable, if at all, by reason of a quasi-contractual
obligation based on the doctrine of unjust enrichment. An idea,
as distinguished from the copyrighted contents of a book or a
patented device or process, is accorded no protection in the law
unless it is acquired and used in such circumstances that the law
will imply a contractual or fiduciary relationship between the
parties. Generally, one who receives a benefit which it is unjust
for him to retain ought to make restitution or pay the value of the
72
benefit to the party entitled thereto.

The requirement of novelty, therefore, may be viewed as a
substitute for the express or implied-in-fact assent that would be
needed for a true contract to be formed. In quasi-contract, novelty
may be necessary to serve as a proxy for the missing element of
assent. By contrast, in a true contract situation, the defendant assents
to the plaintiff’s conditions, either by word or action. Thus, there is
no need for the law to find a proxy for the defendant’s assent. In a
true contract, therefore, because assent is present, novelty is not
needed.
Flemming’s suggestion that novelty might have an evidentiary
rather than a substantive function in idea protection claims was an
intriguing development in the law of idea protection, and one to
which courts and commentators do not give significant attention.
Giving novelty an evidentiary role in contract cases, rather than
treating it as an element of the cause of action, recognizes that
novelty—or any other characteristic of the disclosed idea—is not
needed as a substitute for the assent that creates a contract. Assent

indicates that the cause of action recognized therein is not based upon
contract law, but on tort law. Thus, whether a party misappropriates
another’s confidential idea or some other type of property, the law will
imply an obligation that the party pay the other restitution for its
improper use of that property. In rendering its holding, the
[Flemming] court stated the test for determining whether the law will
imply an obligation to pay for a confidentially submitted idea: When “a
person communicates a novel idea to another with the intention that
the latter may use the idea and compensate him for such use, the other
party is liable for such use and must pay compensation if . . . (1) the
idea was novel; (2) it was made in confidence [to the defendant], and
(3) it was adopted and made use of [by the defendant in connection
with his own activities].”
Id. (citations omitted).
72
Flemming, 107 N.J. Super. at 315-16, 258 A.2d at 156.
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continues to be essential, regardless of novelty. Just as novelty, by
itself, does not prove that the defendant entered a contract, so the
absence of novelty should not, by itself, disprove the existence of a
contract. In contract claims, novelty should be, at most, persuasive
evidence that the defendant derived a benefit from the plaintiff’s
disclosure.
Thus, although the evidentiary role of novelty was articulated by
the Flemming court in the quasi-contract context, that approach seems
to be at least equally appropriate in the context of true contract
claims. Treating novelty as evidence of assent, rather than as an
additional substantive element, respects the traditional freedom-ofcontract rule under which courts will not scrutinize the consideration
73
to which two parties have voluntarily and knowingly agreed.
Treating novelty as evidence of contract formation also respects the
concern that a plaintiff who discloses an idea that the defendant
already possesses might later assert the existence of an implied-in-fact
contract to harass the defendant into an unwarranted settlement.
Where an idea is not very novel, it is reasonable to believe that a
defendant already had access to that idea, or a very similar one, at the
time of the plaintiff’s disclosure, and it is unlikely that the defendant
would have agreed to pay a substantial sum for disclosure of that idea.
By contrast, when a plaintiff discloses a highly unusual idea to a
defendant, and the defendant subsequently profits by using a similar
idea, a factfinder is more likely to infer that the defendant actually
benefited from the plaintiff’s disclosure despite the defendant’s self74
serving assertions of independent creation.
One might draw an analogy to the evidentiary role played by
75
substantial similarity in copyright law.
That standard has two
76
functions: one substantive, one evidentiary. Its substantive role is to
73

See, e.g., Apfel v. Prudential-Bache Sec. Inc., 81 N.Y.2d 470, 475-78 (1993); see
also GLS Dev., Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 944 F. Supp. 1384, 1395 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
74
Courts which find that a defendant did not in fact use or benefit from the
plaintiff’s idea frequently point out the other avenues through which the defendant
might have had, or in fact did have, access to the same idea from other sources. See,
e.g., Burgess v. Coca-Cola Co., 536 S.E.2d 764, 767-68 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (finding
that the idea of a marketing campaign using anthropomorphic polar bears was nonnovel because it was available to defendant from sources other than plaintiff’s idea
submission, and granting summary judgment for defendant on the grounds of
independent creation).
75
Although there is no settled definition for “substantial similarity,” it is
uniformly acknowledged that two works of authorship need not be literally identical
to be substantially similar, but they must have more in common than a mere
similarity of abstract ideas. See, e.g., 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 2, §
13.03[A][1].
76
See 4 id. § 13.01[B]; Alan Latman, “Probative Similarity” as Proof of Copying:
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establish a threshold test of what type and amount of copying
constitutes infringement of copyrighted expression, as opposed to de
77
minimis copying of expression or the mere copying of ideas. In its
evidentiary role, however, substantial similarity is one element of the
two-element circumstantial test for whether a defendant’s work was
copied from the plaintiff, or whether the similarities between the
works are insubstantial enough that they might be attributable to
78
coincidence or mere similarity of ideas. Under this circumstantial
test, a plaintiff need not offer direct proof of copying by the
defendant, but may instead offer indirect or circumstantial proof of
copying by demonstrating that the two works are “substantially
79
similar” and that the defendant had access to the plaintiff’s work.
Contract-based idea protection claims suffer from the same
general type of evidentiary problem as copyright claims. Just as there
may be no direct evidence of copying, so it may also be difficult to
determine, through direct evidence, whether a defendant in fact
promised to provide certain compensation to a plaintiff in return for
a particular idea disclosure. A reasonable finder of fact, however,
would ask whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s position
would have offered to pay the amount the plaintiff asserted in
exchange for disclosure of the idea that the plaintiff in fact provided.
If a plaintiff contends that a defendant agreed to pay a flat sum—for
example, one million dollars—in exchange for disclosing an idea that
is not especially novel, the factfinder is likely to be unpersuaded. By
contrast, if the plaintiff claims only that the defendant agreed to pay
the reasonable value of the idea or a percentage of the profits derived
therefrom, the factfinder might find that the idea’s relative lack of
novelty does not make the existence of the contract quite so
improbable, since the defendant would suffer little or no out-of80
pocket loss if the idea proved to be useless or unprofitable.

Toward Dispelling Some Myths in Copyright Infringement, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1187 (1990);
see also, e.g., Ringold v. Black Entm’t Television, 126 F.3d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1997);
Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946); Castle Rock Entm’t v. Carol Publ’g
Group, 955 F. Supp. 260, 264 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), aff’d, 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998);
Runstadler Studios, Inc. v. MCM Ltd. P’ship, 768 F. Supp. 1292, 1296 (N.D. Ill.
1991).
77
See 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 2, § 13.03[A]; Ringold, 126 F.3d at 74;
Laureyssens v. Idea Group, Inc., 964 F.2d 131, 139-40 (2d Cir. 1992).
78
See, e.g., Laureyssens, 964 F.2d at 139-40; Castle Rock Entm’t, 955 F. Supp. at 264.
In this evidentiary context, some commentators prefer the term “probative
similarity.” See Latman, supra note 76, at 1190 (describing the requisite level of
similarity as “one that under all the circumstances justifies an inference of copying”).
79
See, e.g., Castle Rock Entm’t, 955 F. Supp. at 264.
80
In another analogy to copyright law, one might compare the importance of
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After Flemming was affirmed in 1971, the court’s unusual
approach to the novelty question was almost completely ignored, in
81
New Jersey and elsewhere, for more than thirty years.
In 2001,
Flemming received a new, and somewhat questionable, gloss from the
82
New Jersey Appellate Division in Johnson v. Benjamin Moore & Co. In
contrast to Flemming, which addressed novelty in the context of a
quasi-contract claim, the central issue in Johnson involved a challenge
to the validity of an express written pre-disclosure contract in which
the defendant agreed to pay the plaintiff “a reasonable compensation
based on current industry standards” for the use of the plaintiff’s
83
idea.
The sole basis for challenging the contract was the idea’s
alleged lack of novelty. The trial court held that the plaintiff’s idea
lacked novelty as a matter of law, and that, under Flemming, the
84
express pre-disclosure contract was unenforceable. The appellate
division affirmed on the ground that Flemming required novelty as a
85
prerequisite to relief.
In Johnson, the appellate division adopted the approach of the
86
New York court in Apfel, holding that novelty is a prerequisite to an
enforceable pre-disclosure contract for the use of an idea, even
though it is not a prerequisite to an enforceable post-disclosure

novelty as evidence of an enforceable contract to the importance of originality in
determining whether a derivative work deserves copyright protection. If the
derivative work is not sufficiently distinguishable from the underlying work(s) on
which it is based, its putative copyright owner might be able to pursue unwarranted
claims of infringement against parties who did not in fact copy the derivative work,
but only the underlying work(s) on which it was based. Gracen v. Bradford Exch.,
698 F.2d 300, 304-05 (7th Cir. 1983).
81
In re Elsinore Shore is the only reported decision acknowledging Flemming’s view
of novelty as a probative factor in idea protection cases. In re Elsinore Shore, 102 B.R.
at 969-71. In that case, which adopted the Flemming approach, the court rejected
claims for misappropriation and breach of implied contract because the idea
submitted was “not so unique as to preclude a finding” of independent creation by
the recipient, and because the “dissimilarities” between the idea submitted and the
idea used were “obvious.” Id. at 976. When Apfel was decided twenty-four years later,
the New York court did not acknowledge, much less analyze, the New Jersey
approach, and instead applied the standard of novelty to the buyer to pre-disclosure
contracts, while rejecting a novelty requirement for post-disclosure contracts. In
contrast to Apfel, which involved a true contract claim, Flemming’s view of novelty as
predominantly probative rather than substantive was articulated in the context of a
quasi-contract claim.
82
347 N.J. Super. 71, 788 A.2d 906 (App. Div.), cert. granted and summarily
remanded, 172 N.J. 176, 796 A.2d 893 (2002).
83
Id. at 79, 788 A.2d at 910.
84
Id. at 77-78, 788 A.2d at 910.
85
Id. at 84, 788 A.2d at 915.
86
Apfel, 616 N.E.2d at 1098.
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87

contract.
Johnson also endorsed the interpretations of Apfel by
88
federal courts in Nadel v. Play By Play Toys & Novelties, Inc. and AEB
89
& Assocs. Design Group, Inc. v. Tonka Corp., both of which were non90
contract cases. The Johnson court held that, based on New York
precedent, “general novelty” would no longer be required in cases
involving contract-based claims for the use of ideas; at most, novelty
91
to the buyer would be required. However, it agreed with Nadel that
some ideas may be so lacking in novelty that they may be deemed, as
92
a matter of law, to be non-novel even to the buyer. The court also
acknowledged that the standard of novelty to the buyer was a lower
93
standard than the novelty standard of federal patent law.
Although Johnson noted that both Flemming and Apfel supported
a novelty requirement, the court did not acknowledge that Flemming’s
discussion of novelty was limited to the context of quasi-contract
94
Nor did it acknowledge that both Flemming and Apfel
claims.
implicitly treated novelty as primarily probative rather than
95
substantive. Accordingly, the appellate division held that, in the
absence of novelty, the pre-disclosure contract in Johnson was
unenforceable because the parties did not execute a separate post96
disclosure agreement.
As discussed below, to the extent that Johnson covers new ground
in the law of idea protection, its subsequent remand by the New
Jersey Supreme Court means that it cannot be relied on as an
authoritative statement of New Jersey law. As a result, the role of
novelty in New Jersey’s idea protection doctrine remains unsettled.
Although Johnson attempted a thorough explication of the New
Jersey law of idea protection, that case is no longer authoritative to
the extent that it goes beyond the rules articulated in Flemming.
87

Johnson, 347 N.J. Super. at 85-87, 788 A.2d at 915-16.
34 F. Supp. 2d 180, 182-88 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 208
F.3d 368 (2d Cir. 2000).
89
853 F. Supp. 724, 727-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
90
Johnson, 347 N.J. Super. at 90-91, 788 A.2d at 918-19.
91
Id. at 91, 788 A.2d at 919.
92
Id.
93
Id. at 89-90, 788 A.2d at 918.
94
Id. at 83-87, 788 A.2d at 914-16 (stating simply that Flemming “list[ed] novelty as
a prerequisite for relief in this State”).
95
Id. at 83-84, 788 A.2d at 914 (rejecting the argument that Flemming treated
novelty as evidentiary rather than as essential to “determining whether an agreement
to pay should be implied”); id. at 85, 788 A.2d at 915 (describing Apfel as holding that
“a written contract for sale of non-novel ideas is not enforceable without a postdisclosure agreement”).
96
Johnson, 347 N.J. Super. at 85, 788 A.2d at 915.
88
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Johnson was summarily remanded by the New Jersey Supreme Court
after the plaintiff received a patent on the very idea which the
appellate division had held to be insufficiently novel as a matter of
97
law. Thus, as an indication of current New Jersey law, Flemming must
be viewed as a far stronger authority than Johnson on those points of
law that are discussed in both cases.
The appellate division’s opinion in Johnson added three points of
law that went beyond the holdings in Flemming and thus are
questionable in light of the Johnson remand: (1) the holding that
98
novelty in idea submission cases is a question of law; (2) the explicit
adoption of the New York rule articulated in Apfel, Nadel, and AEB,
which requires some degree of novelty as a prerequisite to all forms
99
of idea protection other than post-disclosure contracts; and (3) the
explicit adoption of the Nadel rule that some ideas are so lacking in
originality that they cannot be protected under either
misappropriation law or pre-disclosure contracts, even though the
lesser standard of novelty to the buyer is the novelty standard that is
100
Because these
otherwise applicable to pre-disclosure contracts.
three holdings in Johnson are now questionable, the only aspects of
Johnson that can currently be relied on as controlling law in New
Jersey are those which were previously articulated in Flemming.
Johnson’s now-uncertain holding that the novelty of an idea is a
question of law was based on a federal district court’s attempt to
101
forecast New Jersey law in Duffy v. Charles Schwab & Co. The Duffy
opinion relied heavily on Flemming. It read the latter case as imposing
absolute novelty as a legal prerequisite to recovery for
misappropriation of an idea based on quasi-contract/unjust
102
enrichment, but not as a prerequisite to a contract claim.
Duffy,
however, viewed novelty as an essential element of consideration, and
thus treated novelty to the buyer as a substantive element of an
103
implied-in-fact contract claim rather than as a probative factor.

97

Johnson, 172 N.J. at 176, 796 A.2d at 893.
Johnson, 347 N.J. Super. at 94, 788 A.2d at 921.
99
Id. at 90-91, 788 A.2d at 918-19. This stands in contrast to Flemming, which
adopted the novelty requirement for quasi-contract claims but did not discuss its
application to true contract claims.
100
Id. at 91 (also citing Khreativity Unlimited v. Mattel, Inc., 101 F. Supp. 2d 177,
185 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 242 F.3d 366 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 822 (2001)).
101
123 F. Supp. 2d 802, 808 (D.N.J. 2000) (cited in Johnson, 347 N.J. Super. at 94,
788 A.2d at 920).
102
Id. at 807-08, 817-18 (also relying on Nadel and other New York cases on idea
protection).
103
Id. at 818.
98
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The Duffy court acknowledged that Flemming did not decide
whether novelty is a question of law or fact, and that factual analysis
would certainly be a part of the novelty determination in most
104
cases.
It concluded, however, that, while underlying factual
determinations might be relevant to the ultimate question of novelty,
105
New Jersey courts would treat the ultimate question as one of law.
In reaching this conclusion, the court in Duffy drew an analogy to
federal patent cases holding that obviousness is a question of law even
though some cases might require the resolution of factual issues
106
before the ultimate legal question could be decided.
The court
acknowledged, however, that rulings from other jurisdictions on this
107
question were mixed.
It did not cite any New Jersey case law,
apparently because no New Jersey court had yet ruled on the
question. Nonetheless, the Johnson court adopted this rule in its
short-lived opinion.
The Second Circuit has read Flemming somewhat differently than
108
the Duffy court. In Bergin v. Century 21 Real Estate Corp., the Second
Circuit upheld the rejection of a plaintiff’s quasi-contract claim. The
court reasoned that the plaintiff’s idea for an advertising campaign
was insufficiently novel to be either “novel to the buyer” or “original
in an absolute sense” because it was “a mere variation” on the
109
defendant’s past advertising campaigns.
Like the courts in Duffy
110
and Johnson, the Bergin court treated novelty as a question of law.
Unlike those courts, however, the Second Circuit read Flemning as
authority for treating novelty in a quasi-contract case as evidentiary
rather than substantive:
Under New Jersey law, a plaintiff seeking relief in quasi-contract
for alleged misappropriation of an idea “is required to establish as
a prerequisite for relief that: (1) the idea was novel; (2) it was
made in confidence; and (3) it was adopted and made use of.”
Novelty under this standard “is more important for its evidentiary

104

Id. at 808.
Id. at 809. The court also found support in Bergin v. Century 21 Real Estate Corp.,
No. 98 Civ. 8075 (JGK), 2000 WL 223833, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2000), aff’d, No. 007381, 2000 WL 1678777 (2d Cir. Nov. 8, 2000) (unpublished), another federal
district court decision which held that novelty was a question of law in New Jersey.
Duffy, 123 F. Supp. 2d at 809.
106
Duffy, 123 F. Supp. 2d at 808.
107
Id.
108
Bergin, 2000 WL 1678777, at *3.
109
The court also upheld the district court’s finding that the alleged agreement
between the parties was too vague to constitute an enforceable implied-in-fact
contract. Id. at *2.
110
Id. at *3.
105
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value than for substantive quality.” Thus, the more novel the
plaintiff’s idea and the closer its resemblance to the defendant’s
finished product, the stronger the inference that the defendant
copied it.
Summary judgment is appropriate where the
defendant knew of the idea or the idea was “[a] matter[ ] in the
domain of public knowledge” before the plaintiff disclosed it to
111
the defendant.

Treating novelty as evidence of copying, however, rather than as
an essential element of the prima facie case, is arguably inconsistent
with treating novelty as a question of law. Even in patent law, where
novelty is a substantive and rigorous requirement for patentability,
112
and is subject to a detailed statutory definition, the determination
113
of novelty is considered a question of fact. In idea protection law,
where the concept of novelty is much less well-defined, it seems selfevident that if novelty is merely indirect evidence that the disclosed
idea had value to the putative buyer, then different gradations of
novelty should be recognized, since different ideas will have different
values to different buyers.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Imposing a novelty requirement for contractual protection of
ideas treats novelty as an essential element of consideration. In
contrast, imposing a novelty requirement in cases of quasi-contract
treats novelty as a substitute for assent rather than consideration.
Prior to the Johnson decision, the New Jersey courts appeared willing
to limit the novelty requirement to non-contractual claims. In
Johnson, however, the Appellate Division appeared to embrace the
concept of novelty as an essential element of consideration.
With Johnson’s remand, its gloss on idea protection law is
suspended. This presents the New Jersey courts with an opportunity
to reconsider the wisdom of following the New York approach to idea
protection contracts.
As noted earlier, California’s approach to idea protection
114
contracts provides a classic counterpoint to New York’s approach.
In recent years, other states have embraced the more liberal
111

Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added) (quoting Flemming, 107 N.J. Super. at
319, 258 A.2d at 158).
112
35 U.S.C. § 102 (2003).
113
Trindec Indus., Inc. v. Top-U.S.A. Corp., 295 F.3d 1292, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Treating novelty as a question of fact in patent law is arguably inconsistent with
treating obviousness as a question of law in such cases. See supra text accompanying
note 106.
114
See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
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California approach. The Michigan Court of Appeals, for example,
115
acknowledged in Sarver v. Detroit Edison Co., a case involving an
employee suggestion plan, that while a plaintiff’s idea may not be
unique or novel, “to the extent that plaintiff seeks compensation for
formulating, drafting, and submitting her idea pursuant to
defendant’s employee suggestion program, rather than for the idea
116
The Sixth
itself[,] she has stated a breach of contract claim.”
Circuit subsequently interpreted Sarver as rejecting a novelty
requirement for contract-based idea protection claims under
117
Michigan law.
A recent case in Alaska also appears to embrace the more liberal
118
approach. In Reeves v. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co., the Supreme Court
of Alaska rejected novelty as a prerequisite for an implied-in-fact
119
contract, although it declined to decide whether novelty was a
120
The plaintiff in that case
prerequisite for an express contract.
argued that his services in disclosing an idea were sufficient
consideration to support a contract where the idea recipient had
agreed, in exchange for the disclosure, to involve the plaintiff in the
resulting venture. Because the plaintiff framed his claim as a breach
of contract to pay for services rather than as an idea, the court found
it unnecessary to resolve the question whether a non-novel idea could
121
be consideration for an express contract.
On the plaintiff’s claim
for breach of an implied-in-fact contract, the court adopted the
California approach and rejected New York’s novelty requirement as
122
modified by Apfel:
We prefer the California approach. An idea may be valuable
to the recipient merely because of its timing or the manner in
which it is presented. In Chandler v. Roach, the court stated that
“the fact that the [recipient of the idea] may later determine, with
a little thinking, that he could have had the same ideas and could
thereby have saved considerable money for himself, is no defense
against the claim of the [idea person]. This is so even though the
material to be purchased is abstract and unprotected material.”

115

571 N.W.2d 759 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997).
Id. at 763.
117
Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446 (6th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534
U.S. 1114 (2002).
118
926 P.2d 1130 (Alaska 1996).
119
Id. at 1141-42.
120
Id. at 1137 n.7.
121
Id. The notion of idea disclosure as a service is also endorsed by the leading
treatise on copyright law. See 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 2, § 16.04[A].
122
Reeves, 926 P.2d at 1141.
116
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Implied-in-fact contracts are closely related to express
contracts. Each requires the parties to form an intent to enter
into a contract. It is ordinarily not the court’s role to evaluate the
adequacy of the consideration agreed upon by the parties. The
bargain should be left in the hands of the parties. If parties
voluntarily choose to bargain for an individual’s services in
disclosing or developing a non-novel or unoriginal idea, they have
the power to do so. The Desny court analogized the services of a
writer to the services of a doctor or lawyer and determined there
was little difference; each may provide a product that is not novel
or original. It held that it would not impose an additional
requirement of novelty on the work. Although Reeves is not a
writer, his ideas are entitled to no less protection than those of
writers, doctors, or lawyers. Therefore, Reeves should be given
the opportunity to prove the existence of an implied-in-fact
123
contract for disclosure of his idea.

The Reeves court’s analogy to writers, doctors, and lawyers is
enlightening. The same reasoning extends to other professionals,
such as accountants. All of these professionals provide advice or
information to their clients based on the express or implied
understanding that the clients will pay for their services. Rarely will
the advice or information be “novel” in an absolute sense. It may also
not be “novel to the buyer,” who may already have the idea in a raw
form but who nonetheless wants the security of knowing that a
person with expertise in the field agrees that the idea is sound. It is
routine for the clients of such professionals to agree in advance to
pay for the professional’s services, either explicitly or implicitly, and
the amount promised may bear little or no relationship to the novelty
of the information or advice that is provided. Both parties recognize
that the payment is for professional services rather than for property.
The leading treatise in copyright law has also endorsed the idea
that pre-disclosure idea protection contracts are contracts for services
rather than property, so that the novelty or other merits of the idea
123

Id. at 1141-42 (citations omitted). The passage from Desny to which the court
refers states:
The lawyer or doctor who applies specialized knowledge to a state of
facts and gives advice for a fee is selling and conveying an idea. In
doing that he is rendering a service. The lawyer and doctor have no
property rights in their ideas, as such, but they do not ordinarily convey
them without solicitation by client or patient.
Desny v. Wilder, 299 P.2d 257, 266 (Cal. 1956). On appeal after remand in Reeves,
the Alaska Supreme Court reaffirmed its approval of the California approach.
Reeves v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 56 P.3d 660, 665-66 (Alaska 2002) (citing
Landsbergh v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 802 F.2d 1193, 1196-97 (9th
Cir. 1986)).
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itself should not determine the enforceability of the contract.
Critiquing one of the leading cases applying the novelty requirement
to an express contract for the disclosure of an idea, the Nimmer
treatise observes:
The court’s decision here would appear to be unsound, because it
seems to ignore the fact that defendant had promised to pay for
the idea without conditioning such promise upon plaintiff’s
producing an idea that would be regarded as “property.” The
better view is to find consideration for defendant’s promise to pay
not in the “property” to be furnished by plaintiff, but rather in
plaintiff’s services in disclosing his idea regardless of whether or
not the idea itself constitutes “property.” Even if the idea
furnished by plaintiff is not original or novel with him and even if
the idea would have been accessible to defendant by means other
than plaintiff’s disclosure, still if in return for plaintiff’s disclosure
defendant promises to pay if he uses the idea and plaintiff does in
fact disclose his idea, then such disclosure should constitute a
124
valid and binding consideration.

The New Jersey courts now have an opportunity to reevaluate
the role of novelty in idea protection contracts. In doing so, they may
find that Johnson gave inadequate consideration to the state’s own
well-reasoned precedents, Elfenbein and Flemming, which deserve more
study than they have thus far received.
Treating novelty as an important probative factor rather than as
an essential element of the contract claim would be consistent with
both Flemming and Elfenbein, as well as with the more moderate
approach to novelty that was broached by the New York Court of
Appeals in Apfel. Under these precedents, courts can respect the
freedom of parties to contract with one another under conditions of
uncertainty—that is, without knowing the value of the idea which is
going to be disclosed. Parties can incorporate that uncertainty into
their contract terms by specifying appropriate conditions for
payment. For example, the parties could specify that the buyer will
pay only the “reasonable value” of the idea, or will pay a percentage
of the profits from the use of the idea only if the buyer is not already
in possession of that idea, or will pay a designated sum for the service
of disclosure regardless of the novelty of the idea. In those cases
where the parties dispute whether or not the defendant actually used
and profited from the plaintiff’s idea, this Article’s proposed analogy
to copyright law would allow the idea’s novelty to serve as evidence of
124

4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 2, § 16.04[A] (footnote omitted)
(critiquing Masline v. N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 112 A. 639 (Conn.
1921)).
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the idea’s value or of the buyer’s possession of the same idea at the
time of the disclosure, without superseding the intent of the parties at
the time of contracting.

